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abstract
The good compliance record of the European Union’s post-communist new member states presents a puz-
zle for dominant approaches in the literature. This paper identifies two possible explanations for how the 
process of pre-accession conditionality can foster compliance after accession is achieved. The first explana-
tion is that the then candidate countries created specialized administrative capacities for the implementa-
tion of EU legislation in preparation for EU membership. These specific capacities might be able to compen-
sate for the otherwise generally weak public administration in the new members. Second, the process of 
pre-accession conditionality socialized the candidate countries into perceiving a link between compliance 
with the EU’s rules and appropriate behavior of good community members. Positive government attitudes 
towards European integration may therefore lead to better compliance in these new member states, while 
in the old member states the perception of a link between compliance and good membership is much 
weaker. Since the logic of these arguments suggests a differential impact of similar factors in old and new 
member states, I conduct a two-step fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of compliance in both 
groups of member states. The results suggest that the two legacies of pre-accession conditionality continue 
to affect compliance in the new member states even after accession has been achieved.
Compliance after Conditionality:
Why Are the European Union’s 
New Member States So Good?
Ulrich Sedelmeier
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1. introduction
States’ compliance with their international commitments is a central question for international coopera-
tion. In the absence of centralized hierarchical enforcement, under what conditions do states comply with 
international agreements? This paper addresses a subset of this broader debate: what explains compliance 
patterns of new members of an international organization? It studies this question by analyzing a specific 
case – compliance with European Union (EU) law in the countries that joined the EU in 2004. This case 
allows us to investigate a highly salient question with regard to new members’ compliance: does it affect 
compliance after accession if an international organization has made membership conditional on a pro-
spective member’s adoption of its rules prior to accession? In other words, does the use of pre-accession 
conditionality by an international institution have a positive impact on post-accession compliance by the 
new members? And if so, through which mechanisms does conditionality achieve such a lasting impact?
The post-accession compliance record of the new members that joined the EU in 2004 appears puzzling. As 
I will elaborate below, dominant explanations for states’ compliance with international rules suggest that 
the conditions for compliance in these countries are generally much less favorable than in the old mem-
ber states. Yet data on infringements of EU law show that – rather than lagging behind the old member 
states – the great majority of the new members outperform virtually all of the old members. This paper 
analyzes whether the experience of pre-accession conditionality – which is specific to the countries that 
joined from 2004 – can explain their unexpectedly good compliance. I identify two key explanations for 
how conditionality can foster compliance after accession. The first explanation is that the then candidate 
countries created specialized administrative capacities in order to meet the EU’s demand to implement 
vast amounts of EU legislation prior to accession. These specific capacities might be able to compensate for 
the otherwise generally weak public administration in the new members. Second, the pre-accession con-
ditionality process has socialized the then candidate countries into perceiving a link between compliance 
with the EU’s rules and appropriate behavior of good community members. Positive government attitudes 
towards European integration may therefore lead to better compliance in the new member states, while in 
the old member states the perception of a link between compliance and good membership is much weaker.
Since the logic of the hypotheses derived from these two explanations suggests that two key factors iden-
tified in the compliance literature – administrative capacities and legitimacy – affect compliance differently 
in old and new member states, I conduct separate analyses of compliance for these two groups. The paper 
draws on general theories of compliance with international institutions to identify pertinent explanatory 
factors. The first set of factors concern states’ preferences with regard to compliance: state power, mem-
bership benefits, and government attitudes towards European integration. The second set of explanatory 
factors concern domestic political constraints that states have to overcome if they choose to comply with 
international rules: administrative capacities, domestic veto players, and domestic cultures of law obser-
vance. The paper uses the distinction between theories that focus on state preferences and on domestic 
constraints to conduct a two-step fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to explain cross-na-
tional variation in the old and new EU member states after the 2004 enlargement. The results suggest that 
three explanatory factors operate differently in the two groups, two of which – attitudes towards European 
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integration and administrative capacities – support the paper’s explanation for why compliance in the new 
member states is better than expected. The surprisingly good compliance of the EU’s new member states, 
thus, results from two legacies of pre-accession conditionality that continue to affect compliance positively 
after accession.
2. The puzzle: good post-accession compliance in the EU’s new member states
Is there anything particularly surprising if new members of an international organization have a better 
compliance record than more long-standing members? Rationalist approaches to compliance would gen-
erally suggest that this is precisely what we should expect. International cooperation relies on the mutual 
trust that other states will play by the agreed rules and resist the temptation to cheat for short-term gains 
(Keohane 1984). New members of an international organization are then under exceptional pressure to 
establish a reputation as trustworthy cooperative partners (Shihata 1965; Simmons 1998: 81). Yet, even if 
we generally expect new members to make particularly strenuous efforts to establish a good compliance 
record, the EU’s post-communist new members should be a hard case for compliance.
A cursory glance at pertinent compliance theories and at the literature on the EU’s pre-accession condi-
tionality in post-communist Europe suggests that the conditions for compliance in these new members 
are generally less favorable than in the old members. The ‘enforcement school’ to compliance with inter-
national institutions emphasizes as a key explanatory factor the adjustment costs that international rules 
impose on domestic actors (see e.g. Fearon 1998; Tallberg 2002: 611-12). The costs of compliance should 
be generally higher for the new member states than the old member states. The post-communist transfor-
mation created high adjustment pressures in view of the significant misfit between planned economies and 
the rules of the EU’s internal market. As the new members did not participate in the creation of EU law, they 
had no opportunity to reduce these domestic adjustment costs. Moreover, since the new member states 
are generally much poorer than the older members, the costs of compliance are particularly onerous. Non-
compliance then results from domestic actors’ attempts to avoid the high costs of compliance. 
The ‘management school’ focuses on administrative capacity limitations as a source of compliance prob-
lems (see e.g. Chayes and Chayes 1993; Simmons 1998: 83; Tallberg 2002: 613-14). From this perspective, 
the conditions in the new members are also highly unfavorable. The post-communist transition involved 
building the necessary administrative capacities to apply and enforce EU law from scratch; and these ca-
pacities generally lag behind the older member states. 
Finally, studies of the EU’s pre-accession influence on the then candidate countries emphasize the impor-
tance of the conditional membership incentive for their compliance with the EU’s demands (Grabbe 2006; 
Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005a; Vachudova 2005). 
Yet, obtaining accession changes the incentive structure for new members. The sanctions for non-compli-
ance at the disposal of EU institutions are no longer as powerful as the threat of withholding membership 
altogether. The changing incentive structure after accession could then be expected to have a negative 
effect on the compliance of new members.
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Yet, in contrast to these negative expectations, post-accession compliance in the new members has been 
surprisingly good. Figure 1 (below) shows the annual infringement decisions taken by the European 
Commission under Article 258 TFEU (ex-226 TEU) against each member state from January 2005 to 
December 2010 (combined number of Reasoned Opinions and referrals to the European Court of Justice, 
ECJ).1 The great majority of new members outperformed virtually all of the older members. The Czech 
Republic and Poland lag behind the other new members, but still perform better than the old members 
on average. This surprisingly good performance of the new member states is not merely a short-term 
phenomenon that masks much less positive long-term trends. Descriptive statistics suggest that neither 
the sunk costs of pre-accession adjustments, nor the temporary special safeguard clause in the accession 
treaty can explain the new members’ good compliance record (Sedelmeier 2012). 
Figure 1: Annual infringements by EU member states (combined Reasoned Opinions and referrals to the 
ECJ), 2005-2010
Source: Own compilation from irregular publications of infringement decisions on the website of the 
Commission’s Secretariat General.2         
 
1 The types of infringements include the late or incorrect transposition of directives, and the deficient application 
of legislation. Including both Reasoned Opinions and referrals to the ECJ implies that persistent serious infringe-
ment cases are weighed more heavily than those that are closed after a Reasoned Opinion. The figure excludes 
infringements in 2004 (rather than starting on 1 May 2004, the accession date of the new members) to avoid a 
possible bias in favor of the new members, given the lead-time for infringement procedures to reach the stage of 
the Reasoned Opinion. The analysis excludes Bulgaria and Romania (that joined in January 2007) as well as Croatia 
(accession in July 2013) due to the shorter observation period.
2 The website of the Commission’s Secretariat General publishes the Commission’s decisions  in infringement cases 
soon after these have been taken. The Commission also publishes similar data in Annual Reports towards the end 
of the following year. They also appear to underreport the number of Reasoned Opinions and ECJ referrals com-
pared to the updates on the website.
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3. Hypotheses: effects of pre-accession conditionality on post-accession 
 compliance in the new member states 
What are distinctive characteristics of the EU’s post-communist new members that create favorable condi-
tions for compliance? I suggest that the process of pre-accession conditionality these countries underwent 
as candidates had two – possibly complementary – key effects on the then candidate countries that might 
be conducive to good post-accession compliance. The first explanation is in line with rationalist manage-
ment approaches to compliance. It concerns the creation of specific administrative capacities to imple-
ment EU law. The second explanation draws on constructivist approaches to compliance and emphasizes 
the importance of conditionality as a socialization process.   
3.1. Administrative capacity building through pre-accession conditionality
Although general administrative capacities are generally much lower in the new members than in the old 
members, a focus on general administrative capacities might be misleading when assessing capacity in the 
new members. Despite generally weak public administrations, the establishment of narrower and specific 
capacities for the implementation of EU law may determine the new member states’ ability to comply (see 
also Sedelmeier 2008: 20-21). Indeed, the literature on pre-accession alignment suggests that, in contrast 
to generally low administrative capacities, the then candidate countries have overall created strong capac-
ities with regard to the specific requirements of coordinating the implementation of EU law. 
Pre-accession conditionality has put pressure on the then candidates to create special administrative mech-
anisms in order to transpose the vast amount of EU law within a short period of time. Sadurski (2006) sug-
gests that precisely the inefficiency of parliamentary and administrative institutions in the post-communist 
countries led the executive to centralize the policy process for the implementation of EU law and to use 
fast-track procedures to by-pass parliament. Zubek (2011) shows that all three of the new member states 
that he studied in depth created centralized mechanisms within the core executive for tracking EU-related 
legislative commitments, monitoring progress and reviewing the quality of transposition. Dimitrova and 
Toshkov (2009: 2) suggest that the candidate countries developed “sophisticated EU co-ordination mech-
anisms which often included levels of coordination and political attention unseen in the ‘older’ member 
states”. They find that variation in the specific organizational procedures put in place by the new members 
to coordinate the implementation of EU law affect their performance with regard to the transposition of 
EU directives as long as they focus on technical, rather than politicized issues. 
Earlier studies have found that the parts of the executive dealing with EU accession present ‘islands of 
excellence’ within otherwise rather weak public administrations (Goetz 2001). More specifically, Verheijen 
(2007: 25-27) notes a strong qualitative difference between the general administrative coordination 
practices in the policy process and the much more advanced coordination processes that are specific to 
European integration. He suggests that for those new members that score highest for their European in-
tegration coordination processes, these mechanisms are on a par with the more general administrative 
coordination mechanisms in advanced old member states. 
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In sum, these insights suggest that the process of pre-accession conditionality left the new member states 
with institutional legacies that are conducive to post-accession compliance. The institutional investment 
in administrative and legislative capacities for the implementation of EU law has created a very specific 
administrative capacity that compensates for their otherwise generally weak administrations. After acces-
sion, some of these specific capacities have been scaled back to varying degrees (Verheijen 2007: 25; Zubek 
2011). But to the extent that they have not been dismantled, these highly specific administrative capacities 
create favorable conditions for compliance in the new member states even if their general administrative 
capacities lag far behind the older member states. On the basis of these considerations, we can, thus, 
formulate the following hypotheses.
H1: The higher a country’s capacities to coordinate the implementation of EU law in new member states, 
the better their compliance.
H1a: While for old member states general administrative efficiency is a good indicator of the administra-
tive capacities affecting their compliance with EU law, in the new member states specific EU-coordination 
capacities are a better indicator.
If these hypotheses are correct, we should expect that measures of specific EU coordination capacities, 
rather than general administrative capacities, shape compliance, while in older member states general 
administrative capacities should be a good indicator of how capacities shape compliance. In principle, two 
different indicators should then capture the impact of capacity in the two groups of members – old and 
new member states.
3.2. Socialization through pre-accession monitoring
Another impact that the experience of pre-accession conditionality had on the new member states is not 
material, but social. The process of conditionality, and in particular the subjection to regular monitoring 
over many years, is also a socialization process for candidate countries and new members. This socializa-
tion process is characterized by a constant assessment of a country’s compliance with EU conditions as 
well as the experience of being rewarded for good compliance with progress on the path to accession. 
Socialization through conditionality does not imply that the candidate countries perceived the conditional-
ity process as positive and legitimate. On the contrary, the top-down nature of the process attracted much 
criticism and created much resentment. Nonetheless, it is possible that the experience instilled in the 
candidate countries the belief that good compliance is closely associated with being a creditable candidate 
that is deserving of membership (Sedelmeier 2008: 821-22). 
The Commission’s annual monitoring reports induced a competition among the then candidates that fo-
cused on their position in the compliance league. Through monitoring they were continuously exposed to 
the notion that compliance with the EU’s obligation was the key criterion for being recognized as viable and 
valued member states. By the same token, these countries would conceive a link between compliance and 
good citizenship after their accession. To the extent that the new members internalized this notion, they 
can be expected to consider good compliance as ‘appropriate behavior’.
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How can we test this proposition? The argument about socialization entails two conjectures that might 
allow us to test its impact on compliance. First, although the notion of conditionality as a socialization pro-
cess should apply fairly uniformly across the candidate countries that underwent this experience, it can still 
account for variation in compliance across the new member states. Perceiving a link between compliance 
and being a good member does not uniformly favor compliance. We would expect only those members 
that have positive attitudes towards the EU and normatively identify with European integration, to aspire 
to be ‘good community members’. Only those new members are, hence, likely to endeavor to comply with 
EU law and to be shamed by bad compliance records. Second, while conditionality might have socialized 
the new members into perceiving a link between compliance and good membership, such a link should 
be much less salient in the older member states that were not subject to conditionality. The latter might 
not see a contradiction between a poor compliance record and considering themselves ‘good citizens’ of 
the EU. Considering that socialization into the link between good citizenship and compliance should only 
matter for new members, and that it should only have a positive impact on those new members that aspire 
to be good citizens, implies that there is an observable indicator that allows us to assess the impact of 
socialization: positive attitudes toward European integration should increase the likelihood of compliance 
in the new member states, but not (necessarily) in the old member states. In other words, while such 
attitudes may not matter for the old members, they should do so for new members. We should be able to 
reject the hypothesis if these attitudes have no impact in the new members. If they matter in both groups, 
the findings are indeterminate, while a finding of an impact in the new but not in the old member state 
should strengthen the plausibility of the hypothesis.
H2: The more the attitudes towards European integration are positive, the better the compliance among 
the new member states.
H2a: Attitudes towards European integration have an impact on compliance in the new member states, but 
not in the old member states.
4. Theories of compliance with international institutions: instrumental reputation, 
 legitimacy, and domestic constraints
This paper examines these hypotheses in combination with other key explanations advanced in the study 
of compliance with international institutions. This section presents an overview of the key explanations 
included in the analysis and how they relate to the key hypotheses discussed above, before discussing the 
paper’s choice for research design and method of analysis. 
The International Relations literature on states’ compliance with international rules can be grouped into 
three broad approaches that respectively focus on states’ cost-benefit calculations, the perceived legiti-
macy of the international institution, and domestic constraints on compliance (see also Börzel et al. 2010, 
Underdal 1998). The first two approaches focus on governments’ preferences but are distinguished by a 
rationalist instrumental logic of action (cost-benefit calculation) versus a constructivist logic of appropri-
ateness (legitimacy). The third approach (domestic constraints) differs from the first two by focusing on 
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involuntary sources of non-compliance at the domestic level. While most studies only draw on rationalist 
approaches to identify constraints on governments’ ability to comply (administrative capacity and veto 
players), we can also distinguish a constructivist variant of approaches focused on domestic constraints 
(culture of law observance).
4.1. Instrumental reputation: state power and membership benefits
The rationalist approach to state preferences with regard to compliance is in line with the above-men-
tioned ‘enforcement’ school of compliance (Fearon 1998; Tallberg 2002: 611-12; Underdal 1998: 7-12; 
Börzel et al. 2010: 1367-8). Governments’ decisions whether or not to comply involve cost-benefit calcu-
lations. For international rules entail domestic adjustment costs for governments; either directly or indi-
rectly by requiring adjustments from important domestic constituencies. The benefits of non-compliance 
are the avoidance of such costs. The costs of non-compliance depend on the likelihood of detection, and 
they entail both direct material costs through sanctions the international institution can impose, as well 
as – crucially – damage to a state’s reputation. From this perspective, reputation has an instrumental value 
and material consequences. Mutually beneficial cooperation is based on the reciprocal trust that the other 
states will resist the temptation to cheat for short-term gains. Since, ultimately, the only effective sanction 
available against non-compliant states is the possibility to cease cooperation with them, it is the threat 
of having to forego the future benefits from cooperation that makes states keen to retain a reputation 
as a trustworthy cooperation partner (Keohane 1984; Guzman 2008). It is in this sense that international 
agreements are self-enforcing: states’ long-term self-interest in maintaining cooperation explains why they 
might forego the short-term benefits of non-compliance.
It is difficult to identify an appropriate indicator of cross-national variation in the costs of compliance with 
EU law in general (as opposed to the adjustment costs for specific rules, or in a particular economic sec-
tor).3 Given the difficulties to operationalize country-specific compliance costs, the analysis can instead 
focus on the other side of the equation in states’ cost-benefit calculations: the benefits of compliance. 
Compliance with EU rules is the price that member states pay to reap the benefits of EU membership. 
Membership benefits come in two main forms: the benefits arising from free trade in the internal market 
and direct transfers from the EU budget, e.g. through the regional policy or the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Those states that benefit more from EU membership are more likely to be prepared to bear the costs of 
compliance than those for which membership benefits are less salient. By the same token, the higher the 
membership benefits, the more a country should be concerned about reputational damage that may risk 
the continued receiving of these benefits. Member states may not have to fear expulsion as a consequence 
of poor compliance, but it damages the states’ membership benefits by undermining mutual trust in the 
functioning of the EU’s internal market more generally. Moreover, the loss of reputational capital may be 
detrimental to states’ ability to influence decision-making, which helps them to maintain membership 
3 Of course, as mentioned above, adjustment costs for new members that did not participate in  rule-making can 
be expected to be higher (but this distinction does not capture variation among both new and old members). In 
general, adjustment costs could be considered higher for poorer countries, but wealth (expressed in GDP/capita) 
is a rather crude proxy for country-specific adjustment costs (and usually co-varies with indicators of administrati-
ve efficiency).
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benefits in the future. Perkins and Neumayer (2007a) find that dependence on intra-EU trade is generally 
positively associated with compliance in the EU, but, contrary to expectations, net fiscal transfers have 
an adverse effect on compliance. Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) suggest that the new members’ greater 
trade dependence on the EU after accession is among the factors that prevent a backsliding with regard to 
democratic reforms, while Knill and Tosun (2009) find that trade with the EU is one the factors that explain 
variation in the transposition performance of the new members.
Apart from the benefits of membership, state power is another key factor that may account for differences 
in states’ vulnerability to the reputational damage that non-compliance causes (Börzel et al. 2010). Power 
does not matter as an indicator of a state’s sensitivity to financial sanctions imposed by the ECJ, since the 
fines are calculated according to a country’s ability to pay. Instead, the argument by Börzel et al. about the 
significance of state power is primarily reputational (see also Perkins and Neumayer 2007b: 22-3). Powerful 
states that are often pivotal to the outcome of EU decision-making under qualified majority voting (QMV) 
are less concerned about their reputation than weaker states. In this sense, Börzel et al. find that the states’ 
‘power of recalcitrance’ is a highly significant explanation of their decision to infringe EU law (see also 
Mbaye 2001: 274).
4.2. Legitimacy: attitudes towards the European integration
Constructivist approaches suggest that compliance with international institutions does not simply de-
pend on the material costs and constraints that governments face, but also on the perceived legitimacy 
of the rule-setting institution (Franck 1990; Checkel 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b: 18-20; 
Underdal 1998: 20-3; Börzel et al. 2010: 1370-1). It is difficult to identify a suitable quantifiable indicator 
for such legitimacy. Favorable attitudes towards European integration among political parties and publics 
might be the best available indicator, although they can also stem from perceived material benefits (note, 
however, that attitudes of government parties do not correlate with indicators of membership benefit such 
as trade dependence on, or financial transfers from, the EU). Börzel et al. (2010: 1380-1) do not find that ‘le-
gitimacy’ (measured as public support for EU membership) increases compliance. In fact, if anything, they 
find an inverse relationship between public support for European integration and compliance (see also e.g. 
Mbaye 2001: 276). On the other hand, Perkins and Neumayer (2007b: 31) do find that public approval of 
the EU positively affects compliance with EU environmental policy. Moreover, the use of support for EU 
membership among government parties as a different indicator also shows mixed results. While Toshkov 
(2008: 397) finds evidence that it is beneficial for timely transposition of a random sample of 119 directives 
in the new members, it does not seem to matter in Linos’ (2007: 563) analysis of EU social policy. 
With regard to the specific focus of this paper, the legitimacy hypothesis differs from the socialization 
hypotheses H2/H2a discussed above in that the latter would only expect the EU’s perceived legitimacy to 
have a (positive) impact in the new member states that underwent the process of accession conditionality, 
but not necessarily in the old member states.
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4.3. Domestic constraints: administrative, political, and cultural constraints on compliance
Another set of arguments focus on domestic politics in order to explain compliance with internal rules. We 
need to distinguish these domestic explanations from those that focus on domestic litigation in national 
courts as a strategy for the beneficiaries of international law to ensure state compliance (Simmons 2009; 
Börzel 2006). Non-compliance that is addressed through the national legal system is not included in the in-
fringement data, which consists of infringement cases pursued by the European Commission, either as the 
result of decentralized complaints raised, e.g. by private actors in the member states, or more centralized 
own investigations and failures of member states to report the transposition of EU legislation. 
The ‘management school’ to international compliance suggests that non-compliance with international 
institutions might not be the result of governments’ deliberate choice (Chayes and Chayes 1993, Tallberg 
2002: 613-14; Underdal 1998: 12-20; Börzel et al. 2010: 1369-70). Even if government preferences – 
whether material or legitimacy-driven – are favorable to compliance, involuntary non-compliance can 
result from various constraints at the domestic level. One source of such constraints are administrative 
capacities. Börzel et al. (2010) find that these matter for compliance in the EU (see also e.g. Linos 2007: 
563; Mbaye 2001: 274; Siedentopf and Ziller 1988), especially in combination with ‘power’. Studies focused 
specifically on compliance in the new member states prior to, or soon after, accession also find support for 
explanations focused on administrative capacity (Hille and Knill 2006; Knill and Tosun 2009; Toshkov 2008, 
2009). With regard to the specific focus of this paper, hypothesis H1 differs from the expectations of the 
management school with regard to administrative capacities in that H1 would expect general administra-
tive capacities only to affect the impact of capacity in the old member states. In the new member states, 
H1 expects that the more specific administrative capacities required for coordinating EU affairs are a more 
appropriate indicator of the existence of capacity constraints.
If national governments want to comply with international institutions, they are not only constrained by 
the capacity of their public administration. Domestic political constraints also emanate from the national 
political system that structures decision-making. Veto players who incur costs through compliance can 
thwart government attempts to pass legislation implementing international commitments. At the same 
time, and somewhat counter-intuitively, such political constraints can be beneficial for compliance. If gov-
ernments are under greater pressure at the negotiation stage to seek compromises in order to generate a 
domestic consensus, domestic opposition is less problematic at the implementation stage. More generally, 
domestic constraints through multiple veto players and coalition politics can induce a consensual political 
culture (Lijphart 1999). Although Boerzel et al. (2010) do not find any empirical support for the relevance of 
this factor (see also Mbaye 2001: 274), Linos (2007: 563) finds a negative impact in the case of social policy, 
while Hille and Knill (2006) find that in candidate countries prior to accession it is conducive to compliance, 
rather than an obstacle. 
Domestic constraints and enabling conditions for compliance do not only relate to material factors. 
Constructivist approaches draw attention to domestic cultures of law-observance as a key factor for com-
pliance with international rules (Börzel et al. 2010: 1370). While the large-n qualitative study of EU social 
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policy by Falkner et al. (2005: 329) suggests that a ‘culture of law observance’ is crucial for compliance (and 
may override domestic political constraints), Börzel et al. (2010: 1380) find no support for the argument. 
Table 1 (below) summarizes this classification of approaches to compliance and the key explanatory factors 
derived from them.
Table 1: Classification of explanations for compliance
Rationalism Constructivism
Government preferences State power;
Membership benefits
Legitimacy of/attitudes towards 
the EU
Domestic constraints Administrative capacities;
Veto players
Culture of law observance
Source: Author.
5. Research design and method: fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
In order to analyze the explanatory power of these two factors, the paper splits the sample of the EU mem-
ber states to conduct separate analyses of compliance in the ten new member states that joined in 2004 
(EU10) and in the 15 old member states (EU15). The reason for doing so is that the two hypotheses suggest 
that general factors used in the study of compliance with international institutions have different effects 
in the two groups. With regard to administrative capacities that affect compliance, the argument suggests 
that measurements of a country’s general administrative capacity are a good indicator in the old member 
states, but not in the new member states. Instead, an indicator of these countries’ specific capacities for 
the coordination of the implementation of EU law should capture this factor much better. With regard to 
support for European integration, the socialization hypothesis expects these attitudes to matter in the new 
member states, but not (necessarily) on the old member states.
In order to conduct the analyses, this paper uses fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 
2008). The choice of method responds both to limitations in the data and to substantive considerations. A 
limitation of the data is that we only have a single data point for the indicator for the specific administrative 
capacities related to the coordination of EU affairs and the implementation of EU law (Verheijen 2007: 26) 
(and only for the new member states). I therefore use individual member states as the unit of analysis (av-
eraging data for independent and dependent variables of a five-year period). FsQCA allows us to conduct 
a systematic analysis of the resulting medium n of 25 cases, split into samples of 15 and ten old and new 
member states respectively. 
Apart from necessity, resulting from data limitations, what makes fsQCA particularly promising as a tech-
nique for explaining compliance with EU law is that it is particularly well equipped to analyze causal com-
plexity and equifinality (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Its ability to capture the causal 
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effects of combinations of explanatory factors and the possibility that more than one causal path leads to 
the outcome is particularly valuable in view of the state of the compliance literature. The study of compli-
ance in the EU has moved increasingly towards large-n studies using sophisticated quantitative techniques 
(for overviews, see Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2014). Yet the results are still somewhat inconclusive about 
what factors explain cross-country variation (especially at the aggregate level of the entire population of EU 
law and member states). The literature has identified a wide range of (country-, sector- or legislation-spe-
cific) explanatory factors for cross-country compliance patterns, but while some are found to be relevant in 
some analyses, the findings are not consistent across different studies. 
The lack of consensus about the (ir)relevance of particular factors might be an indication of the limitations 
of monocausal explanations of compliance. The obvious example for the need to consider configurational 
explanations is that a government might seek to comply – either because as a weak state it feels under 
(reputational) pressure to do so or because it perceives the EU as legitimate – but it may only achieve 
compliance in states that also have sufficient administrative capacities or do not face political constraints 
(or both). Another example is that powerful states (or states with low membership benefits) might, none-
theless, comply if they perceive the EU as legitimate (see also Börzel et al. 2010: 1371-2). Likewise, weak 
states might also infringe EU law if their benefits from EU membership are low.
Indeed, qualitative case studies and analyses of specific directives often point to the importance of com-
binations of explanatory conditions – for example that party political preferences only matter in combi-
nation with a specific domestic compliance culture (Falkner et al. 2005), a combination of government 
preferences and administrative capacities (Toshkov 2009), or that high administrative capacities do not 
matter with regard to politically highly salient legislation (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009). By contrast, studies 
of compliance with the entirety of EU law across all member states have been slow to include complex 
causation. The study by Börzel et al. (2010) is path-breaking precisely through its analysis of interaction 
effects between their three main explanatory factors in a quantitative analysis. Still, there are inherent 
difficulties for regression analyses. Modeling of interactions between more than two variables is rare since 
these are difficult to interpret. The ability of fsQCA to capture complex combinatorial causation, includ-
ing an identification of (combinations of factors that are) necessary and sufficient conditions, is therefore 
highly promising for the study of compliance. 
Moreover, compliance studies usually assume that the same factors cause compliance and (their absence) 
non-compliance. In view of the inconclusive and sometimes contradictory findings in the literature, the 
ability of fsQCA to grasp asymmetrical causation – that different (combinations of) factors might explain 
compliance and non-compliance respectively – should be an advantage. 
A drawback for the use of fsQCA to explain compliance at the country level is that the unit of analysis are 
states (and their compliance record), although the underlying unit of analysis (i.e. the actual ‘cases’, each 
of which can have ‘compliance’ or ‘non-compliance’ as its outcome) are individual pieces of legislation that 
a country has to comply with (and thus presents a ‘violative opportunity’ (Börzel 2003)). Due to its focus on 
the aggregate number of actual infringements per country, the analysis loses much of the qualitative case 
study characteristics that fsQCA values. Usually conducting fsQCA is only the first step of the analysis, after 
                               Compliance after Conditionality | 17
which the researcher should go back to the cases in order to assess the results in a qualitative analysis of 
causation in specific cases. Yet, assessing the causal role of the country-specific results through in-depth 
qualitative case studies is difficult in view of the aggregate nature of the unit of analysis.
5.1. Operationalizing the outcome: compliance and non-compliance
The outcome to be explained are the cross-national differences in the level of compliance. Compliance is 
measured on the basis of the aggregate number of Reasoned Opinions and ECJ referrals for each member 
state between 2005 and 2010, as presented in Figure 1 (I exclude Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Croatia, 
due to the shorter observation period since these countries only joined the EU in 2007 and 2013 respec-
tively).4 The data include all three types of infringements of EU law – non-transposition into national law, 
incorrect transposition, and deficient application of (correctly transposed) legislation.
The paper assigns to the member states different fuzzy scores that indicate the extent to which they have 
membership in the set of ‘compliant member states’. These scores are directly calibrated, using three qual-
itative anchors that indicate when a case is ‘fully in’ the set of cases sharing the outcome (fuzzy score 0.95), 
‘fully out’ (fuzzy score 0.05), and the cross-over point (fuzzy score 0.5) at which there is maximum ambigu-
ity as to whether a case is more in or out of the target set. Degrees of membership of the various cases in 
the different sets are then calibrated using the fsQCA software package (Ragin et al. 2007). Since this paper 
splits the sample of EU member states and conducts separate analyses of compliance in the old member 
states (EU15) and the new members (EU10), I calibrate separate fuzzy scores for compliance for each group 
using cluster analysis. Separate scores ensure sufficient variation with regard to the outcome (compliance) 
in each group. Using cluster analysis to calibrating the scores for the full sample of EU member states would 
lead to the inclusion of most of the new members in the set of ‘good compliance’. The resulting scores 
would then be insufficiently sensitive to the variation among the new member states, which a separate 
analysis should aim to capture. 
Although fsQCA should base its calibration on criteria that are external to the sample, such an external 
standard is difficult to identify for the outcome in this case. While it is certainly possible for researchers 
to agree on a general threshold, e.g. of GDP/capita for a country to be considered ‘developed’, there is no 
generally accepted standard with regard to the number of Reasoned Opinions and ECJ referrals during a 
given period that would designate a state as ‘compliant’ with EU law. I therefore use cluster analysis in the 
TOSMANA software package (Cronqvist 2011) and natural breaks in the data to identify the three thresh-
olds. This reliance on sample-specific measures means that the outcome set is more accurately described 
as the set of ‘compliance leaders in the enlarged EU’ (during the observation period), rather than present-
ing an absolute standard of ‘countries that comply with international/EU law’ more generally. Annex 1 
presents the thresholds used to calibrate the outcome and explanatory conditions, as well as further detail 
on the data sources used. 
4 I use the period 2005-2010 (2004-2009 for the explanatory factors to account for the time lag to prepare for timely 
and correct transposition) rather than up to 2015, since this six-year period makes it easier to justify the use of 
average scores over this period: the explanatory factors included in the analysis do not change very strongly over 
time. This period also does not move too far from the year (2007) for which we have data with regard to the new 
members’ specific administrative capacities for the coordination of EU affairs.
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5.2. Explanatory conditions
Since the relevant cases, or the units of analysis, are member states, not country years, I generally average 
annual data for the explanatory conditions over the period 2004-2009. The difference to the observation 
period for the outcome (2005-2010) accounts for the time-lag between detecting infringements and send-
ing a Reasoned Opinion, and for the lead-time required to prepare for the implementation of new legis-
lation (i.e. whether infringements emerge in a given year often depends on the constellation of domestic 
conditions during the previous year). 
As an indicator of state power (POWER), this paper uses the number of weighted votes that a member state 
has under qualified majority voting (QMV) to calibrate whether a member state belongs to the group of 
powerful states. With regard to membership benefits, dependence on intra-EU trade (TRDP) is calculated 
as the value of exports to and imports from the EU (as reported by the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics) 
as a percentage of GDP (based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). Net transfers (TRNSF) 
from the EU budget per capita are calculated from data by the European Commission (2010: 79-84) and 
Eurostat (for population data).
As an indicator for attitudes towards European integration (GOVSPP), I focus on the attitudes of national 
governments. In doing so, I focus on governments rather than public opinion data, since the socializa-
tion argument should apply more strongly to political elites than to the general public. I capture govern-
ment attitudes through the preferences of government parties, weighted by a party’s share of the seats 
held by government parties in parliament. The data on party positions towards European integration are 
drawn from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 (Hooghe et al. 2010). Since this dataset does not include 
Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus, I adapt the data for these three countries from Benoit and Laver (2006).
To assess a state’s general administrative capacity (CAPACITY), I use the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009), but focus exclusively on the indicator ‘government effectiveness’ that comes clos-
est to a proxy for the administrative capacity relevant for the implementation of EU law. As described in 
the World Bank’s list of governance indicators, it “measures the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”.5 As explained 
above, I use this indicator for administrative capacity only for the analysis of the old member states, while 
using a different indicator for the new member states that, I believe, better captures the relevant capacities 
in these countries. As an indicator of the more specific capacities to coordinate the implementation of EU 
law (EUCOOR), I use the scores that Verheijen (2007: 26) provides for the institutional mechanisms for the 
coordination of EU affairs .
To operationalize political constraints (CONSTR) through veto players, I use the indicator for ‘checks’ in 
the World Bank database on Political Institutions (Keefer and Stasavage 2003). I use a composite indicator 
for domestic cultures of law-observance (LAWOBS), drawing on answers to two separate questions in the 
European Social Survey (2004, 2006, 2008). The first question concerns the trust in the legal system, and 
5 available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq, accessed 5 May 2016.
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the other one asks whether one should always obey the law. The fuzzy scores are calibrated separately, but 
I combine them with a logical ‘AND’ for an aggregate score of law observance, meaning that the lower of 
the two scores determines the score for the combined indicator ‘law-observance’. The rationale for doing 
so is that I assume that in order for a country to be in the set of member states that are characterized by 
a strong culture of law-observance, there should be high levels of both trust in the legal system and the 
believe that one should always obey the law.
6.  Analysis and findings
6.1. The two-step fsQCA approach
The large number of potentially relevant explanatory conditions is a problem when examining a medium 
number of cases (especially once the sample is split into separate analyses of old and new member states), 
and even more so when the analysis aims to capture complex configurational causation. Seven explana-
tory conditions generate 128 (27) logically possible combinations of dichotomously coded conditions. The 
analysis would therefore lead to a large number of ‘logical remainders’ of possible combinations that are 
empirically unobserved in the sample of cases. If we do not want to exclude any of the explanatory con-
ditions a priori from the analysis, fsQCA offers strategies how to reduce, first, the number of these logical 
remainders, and then how to treat these remainders in the analysis. 
FsQCA offers three possible approaches for how do deal with logical remainders explicitly in the analysis 
(Ragin 2008: 147-57), which differ in their use of counterfactuals. The most conservative approach does 
not make any simplifying assumptions about cases that are empirically unobserved. It leads to the most 
complex results by coding the outcome as absent for all unobserved combinations of conditions. The most 
parsimonious solution is to code the outcome of unobserved combinations as either absent or present 
such as to allow the researcher to minimize solution terms as much as possible. The intermediate solution 
is to use only ‘easy’ counterfactuals (on the basis of existing theoretical and empirical knowledge) if these 
lead to less complex results.
In order to reduce the number of logically possible remainders, Schneider and Wagemann (2006) have 
pioneered a two-step approach that allows fsQCA to draw manageable, but nevertheless theoretically 
subtle inferences, despite the limited diversity of empirically observed cases and a large number of ex-
planatory conditions. To explain the consolidation of democracy, their approach distinguishes between 
two types of explanatory conditions – ‘remote’ conditions that concern the structural context in which 
democratic transition takes place, and ‘proximate’ conditions that concern institutional choices about 
the political system and that are more easily amenable to decision-makers’ choices. The first step of the 
analysis only includes the ‘remote’ conditions. The solution terms emerging from this first step are then 
analyzed in a second step in combination with the ‘proximate’ conditions. In other words, the analysis first 
identifies ‘outcome-enabling conditions’ under which the outcome is likely to occur, and then the specific 
(combinations of) proximate conditions within these structural contexts that jointly result in the outcome. 
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The two-step approach, thus, allows us to avoid overly complex results (by using theoretical reasoning to 
exclude certain logically possible combinations of factors from the outset) while it maintains fsQCA’s ability 
to capture causally complex explanations.
Drawing on Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012) approach, this paper distinguishes between two dif-
ferent types of conditions: those that affect governments’ preferences whether to comply with interna-
tional rules, and those determining the domestic constraints that may help or hinder governments’ pursuit 
of compliance if they choose to do so. Table 2 presents the distinction of explanatory conditions for this 
two-step analysis. This application of the two-step fsQCA approach to compliance differs from Schneider 
and Wagemann’s (2006, 2012), which involves an explicit theory on how different combinations of remote 
and proximate conditions lead to the consolidation of democracy (namely a dispersion of power), and 
where no given remote or proximate condition is, as such, favorable or unfavorable for the outcome, but 
may lead to it in the ‘right’ combination. The distinction between ‘preference’ conditions and ‘domes-
tic’ conditions implies that specific factors in each group of conditions may well always be (un)favorable. 
Moreover, rather than expecting compliance will necessarily depend on particular combinations of prefer-
ences and domestic constraints, it may well be the case that either specific (combinations) of preference 
conditions or domestic conditions determine (non)compliance while the other set of factors is irrelevant.
Table 2: Distinction of explanatory factors for two-step analysis
Rationalism Constructivism
1st step: government 
preferences
POWER, TRDP, TRNSF GOVSUPP




6.2. Explanation for (non)compliance in the 10 new member states
The first step of the analysis for the new member states (EU10) includes only those conditions that affect 
governments’ preferences (POWER, TRDP, TRNSF, GOVSPP). Since this first step is intended to identify those 
preference conditions that are compliance-enabling, it uses the parsimonious solution. In other words, it 
makes counterfactual arguments about the outcome of unobserved cases in such a way that these always 
result in a less complex solution. The analysis of ‘preference conditions’ leads to the following solution for 
the EU10 (uppercase denotes the presence, and lowercase the absence, of a condition; * is a logical ‘AND’ 
and + a logical ‘OR’):
COMPLIANCE (EU10) --> power * GOVSUPP
compliance (EU10)     --> POWER + govsupp 
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Thus, the compliance-enabling preference conditions are that a state is weak and has a government that 
supports European integration (solution consistency 0.77; coverage 0.94; see Annex 2 for detailed results). 
Conversely, either strong states or states whose governments do not support European integration are 
more likely not to comply (solution consistency 0.98, coverage 0.52). The conditions that relate to member-
ship benefits are redundant. This preliminary result is certainly plausible, although the kind of theoretical 
synthesis that it suggests is not obvious. A more obvious combination of power-based and legitimacy-based 
compliance theories would be that powerful states only resort to non-compliance if their governments do 
not support European integration (while supportive governments comply even if they did not have to fear 
the reputational costs), or that both state weakness and government support for European integration are 
equifinal paths to compliance. Yet, the above result suggests that neither is a sufficient condition on its 
own. Governments appear to care at the same time both instrumentally about their reputation and about 
acting appropriately. Taken by itself, neither explanatory condition is fully sufficient to lead to compliance, 
which thus requires simultaneously strategic and normative motivation.
The second step analyzes these solution terms in combination with the conditions that affect domestic 
constraints on compliance (EUCOOR, CONSTR, LAWOBS). Since the analysis now seeks precise formulations 
of causal solution paths, it only uses ‘easy’ counterfactual arguments about the outcome of unobserved 
cases. Such a counterfactual argument is ‘easy’ if the unobserved case differs from an observed case (that 
leads to the same outcome) only with regard to condition(s) for which our theoretical and empirical knowl-
edge suggests that its setting in the unobserved case is conducive to this outcome. The analysis leads to the 
following paths to (non)compliance:
COMPLIANCE (EU10) -->  power * GOVSUPP * (EUCOOR + constr)
compliance (EU10)     -->      eucoor * lawobs
Thus, there are two possible causal paths to compliance among the new members (solution consistency 
0.87, coverage 0.88). Both paths share the conditions that these states are weak and have governments 
that support European integration. These preference conditions need to be combined with one of two 
domestic context conditions to lead to compliance: either with strong mechanisms for the coordination of 
EU affairs, or the absence of political constraints through veto players. For non-compliance, the conditions 
affecting government preferences are irrelevant. A weak mechanism for the coordination of EU affairs in 
combination with the absence of a domestic culture of law observance leads to non-compliance (consis-
tency 0.81, coverage 0.81).
6.3. Explanation for (non)compliance in the 15 old member states
The first step of the analysis for the EU15 leads to one causal path for those preference conditions that 
enable compliance:
COMPLIANCE (EU15) --> power * trnsf 
compliance (EU15)     --> POWER + TRNSF
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Thus, weak states that do not receive net transfers from the EU budget appear more likely to comply with 
EU law (consistency 0.99, coverage 0.54). Conversely, non-compliance becomes more likely either if states 
are powerful, or if they receive net transfers (consistency 0.68, coverage: 0.99). The role of state power fits 
with the findings by Börzel et al. (2010), but the impact of budget transfers – although consistent with the 
(counterintuitive) finding by Perkins and Neumayer (2007a) – makes it difficult to find a plausible explana-
tion for these causal paths. In any case, these solution terms disappear after the second step in which each 
of them is analyzed in combination with the conditions affecting the domestic context (CAPACITY, CONSTR, 
LAWOBS):
COMPLIANCE (EU15) --> CAPACITY
compliance (EU15)     --> capacity * constr
Thus, in the old member states, compliance with EU law requires states only to have high administrative 
capacities (consistency 0.80, coverage 0.97). Conditions that affect state preferences do not appear rele-
vant for (non)compliance. Thus, in contrast to the findings by Börzel et al. (2010), this result suggests that 
administrative capacities are a necessary and sufficient condition, rather than leading only to compliance if 
combined with a lack of state power. The result for non-compliance is also a single path, but consists of two 
domestic conditions: states that, firstly, lack administrative capacities and, secondly, do not face domestic 
political constraints (consistency 0.99, coverage: 0.66). This combination suggests that domestic political 
constraints have to be interpreted as beneficial for compliance by fostering a consensual political culture. 
Although they are not necessary for compliance, their absence – when combined with unfavorable admin-
istrative capacities – leads to non-compliance.
6.4. Different effects of specific explanatory factors on compliance in old and new members
Apart from the general differences in the explanatory paths in the old and new members, three differences 
stand out with regard to the differential impact of particular factors in the two groups. The first factor that 
affects compliance in different ways in the two groups is unrelated to the two main hypotheses about the 
impact of pre-accession conditionality. While in the old member states the absence of domestic political 
constraints is a necessary part of the causal recipe for non-compliance, for the new member states, their 
absence is part of a sufficient combination for compliance. This result suggests that in the old member 
states constraints in the political system induce consensual politics that remove domestic obstacles to 
compliance, while in the new members constraints lead to blockages that are detrimental to a proper 
implementation of EU law. While this finding neither confirms nor contradicts the main hypotheses, it 
still raises the question how these differences can be explained. One plausible explanation is that the 
new post-communist political systems tend more towards polarized politics than those in Western Europe. 
Multiple veto players and checks and balances would then foster a more consensual political culture that 
is beneficial to compliance in Western Europe, while in the post-communist new members they lead to 
mutual blockages in the political process that cause compliance problems.
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The second result confirms hypotheses H1 and H1a about the role of administrative capacities. While for 
old member states administrative capacities are a necessary and sufficient condition for compliance, for the 
new member states more specific capacities to coordinate EU affairs are important. Although the general 
capacities are usually rather low, strong capacities with regard to the requirements for the administrative 
coordination of the implementation of EU law can lead to compliance (in combination with other favorable 
conditions, namely a lack of state power and government support for EU membership). Conversely, the 
absence of such specific administrative capacities to coordinate EU affairs is a necessary condition for 
non-compliance.
The results also confirm hypotheses H2 and H2a about the impact of conditionality as a socialization pro-
cess that forged among political elites in the new members the notion that compliance with EU law is linked 
to being a ‘good community member’. For the new member states favorable government attitudes towards 
European integration are a necessary part of both causal paths to compliance. In other words, only those 
governments (in the new member states) that care about being good members comply with EU law. By 
contrast, government attitudes towards the EU are irrelevant for compliance in the old members. Since 
governments in the old members were not socialized into considering good compliance as ‘appropriate 
behavior’ for ‘good’ member states, they do not see a contradiction between a poor compliance record and 
considering themselves ‘good citizens’ in the EU. 
7. Conclusion
The good post-accession compliance of the states that joined the EU in 2004 is puzzling. It appears at odds 
with the dominant explanations of compliance with international rules. This paper has therefore analyzed 
whether the experience of pre-accession conditionality can explain this unexpectedly good performance. 
It identifies two main effects that conditionality had on the new member states and that may continue to 
have a positive impact on compliance after accession. The first factor is the creation of highly specialized 
administrative capacities that are required to implement large amounts of EU legislation during a short 
period of time. Such specific capacities can help the new member states achieve compliance, even if their 
more general administrative capacities are weak. The second factor is the socialization process that the 
new member states underwent through the experience of pre-accession conditionality. The experience of 
regular assessment and monitoring of compliance, and of the link between progress with compliance and 
progress towards membership, instilled in the political elites of these countries the belief that compliance 
is linked to being a good EU member. This link does not in itself uniformly lead to good compliance in all 
states that experienced conditionality: the perception of such a link only favors compliance if a government 
cares about being considered a good member state. By contrast, for Eurosceptic governments, socialization 
through conditionality does not lead to better compliance. 
This paper has analyzed these two explanations through a two-step fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis of a number of explanatory conditions identified by the main approaches to compliance with 
international institutions. In the first step the analysis included those explanatory factors that determine 
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government preferences for compliance: state power as an indicator of vulnerability for reputational con-
cerns, dependence on intra-EU and budgetary receipts as different types of membership benefits; and 
government attitudes towards European integration as an indicator of whether they perceive the EU as 
legitimate. In the second step, the analysis included the explanatory factors that determine the domestic 
constraints governments face if they chose to comply with EU law: administrative capacities, veto players, 
and cultures of law-observance. Since the logic of the two explanations about how conditionality affects 
pre-accession compliance suggests that two factors – administrative capacities and attitudes towards 
European integration – affect compliance differently in the old and new member states, the paper con-
ducted separate analyses of compliance in these groups.  
The results of the analysis are that in the old member states, conditions that affect state preferences are 
irrelevant for compliance (in contrast to leading explanations that emphasize the importance of state 
power, or of membership benefits): administrative capacities are a necessary and sufficient condition for 
compliance, while non-compliance results from a combination of a lack of administrative capacities with 
the absence of veto-players. The explanation for compliance in the new members is more complex. Two 
equifinal paths lead to compliance: weak states with governments supportive of European integration, in 
combination with either an efficient mechanism to coordinate EU affairs, or a lack of domestic veto players. 
Non-compliance is independent of government preferences but is a consequence of domestic constraints: 
it results from the lack of efficient coordination of EU affairs in combination with an absence of a domestic 
culture of law-observance.
Apart from identifying different explanations of compliance in old and new members, the results suggest 
three key differences with regard to how particular factors influence (non)compliance; two of which speak 
directly to the hypothesized impact of pre-accession conditionality on compliance. First, for the old mem-
ber states, the absence of domestic political constraints is conducive to non-compliance, while in the new 
members it is conducive to compliance. These differences in the impact of veto players suggests that in the 
old member states strong checks on government autonomy are more likely to lead to the emergence of a 
consensual political culture, which, in turn, facilitates compliance, while polarization in the post-communist 
political systems generally tends to be much stronger. A higher number of veto players does not facilitate 
the emergence of consensus democracies, but rather leads to mutual obstructions that are detrimental to 
compliance with international rules.
The differences in the impact of veto players do not explain why the new members comply better with EU 
law than the old members. The other two factors that appear to have different effects in the two groups of 
member states can provide such an explanation; they are in line with the two hypotheses about how the 
experience of conditionality prior to accession contributes positively to compliance even after condition-
ality has expired.
Firstly, the results confirm that in the new member states, the very specific capacities to coordinate EU 
affairs matter. Such specific EU coordination structures are a result of pre-accession conditionality, since 
the pressure to transpose large amounts of EU legislation in a fairly short time period has forced the new 
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members to invest heavily in such capacities. If these specific administrative capacities are strong, compli-
ance is possible even if the general effectiveness of the public administration is otherwise low. Although 
a few of the new members have started to dismantle some of these capacities, the remaining strengths 
compensate for the absence of more general administrative effectiveness.
Secondly, the beneficial impact of positive government attitudes in the new members on compliance (in 
contrast to the old members) provides evidence for the argument that pre-accession conditionality is a 
socialization process in which government elites in then candidate countries internalize that compliance 
is appropriate behavior for ‘worthy community members’. By contrast, governments in the old member 
states are less likely to think of their bad compliance record as a sign of ‘bad citizenship’. The internalization 
of such a link does not automatically make all new members comply well. For instance, governments that 
do not support European integration are not concerned about being bad citizens. But to the extent that 
they do support European integration – as the governments of most new members do – they are more 
likely to comply well, while this attitude does not have such a positive impact on compliance in the old 
members.
In sum, certain legacies of pre-accession compliance may explain the positive compliance record of the 
new members: the building-up of specific capacities for the implementation of EU law and the perceived 
link between compliance and good community citizenship. While these factors make good post-acces-
sion compliance not merely a short-term phenomenon, they are vulnerable to erosion in the long run. 
Investments in administrative structures can be dismantled as political priorities shift (and, indeed, this 
has started to happen in some new members) and the perception of a normative value of compliance can 
wane with an increasing realization that most other member states do not strive equally to perform well. 
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Annex 2: Detailed results of fsQCA
2.1. Analysis: compliance EU10
Step 1: preference conditions         
frequency cutoff: 1.000000                 
consistency cutoff: 0.780034   
      raw      unique    
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---   coverage coverage consistency 
~power*govsupp         0.944345     0.944345     0.769006  
solution coverage: 0.944345          
solution consistency: 0.769006 
--- COMPLEX & INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION         
~power*trnsfs*govsupp       0.924596     0.924596     0.785061  s o l u -
tion coverage: 0.924596          s o l u -
tion consistency: 0.785061 
Step 2: domestic constraint conditions         
in combination with result for preference conditions (~power*govsupp)
consistency cutoff: 0.937500 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---         
(~power * GOVSUPP)*~constr        0.557235     0.112311     0.845902  
(~power * GOVSUPP)*eucoord    0.766739     0.321814     0.956873  
solution coverage: 0.879050          
solution consistency: 0.871520 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
(~power * GOVSUPP)*~lawobs*~constr   0.557235     0.112311     0.966292  
(~power * GOVSUPP)*eucoord~lawobs   0.762419     0.317495     0.991573 
solution coverage: 0.874730          
solution consistency: 0.978261 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
eucoord                    0.777538     0.332613     0.871671  
(~power * GOVSUPP)*~constr        0.557235     0.112311     0.845902  
solution coverage: 0.889849          
solution consistency: 0.809430 
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2.2. Analysis: non-compliance EU10
Step 1: preference conditions         
consistency cutoff: 0.965753 
--- PARSIMONIOUS & INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION---       
~govsupp          0.252822     0.108352     1.000000  
power            0.410835     0.266366     0.973262  
solution coverage: 0.519187          
solution consistency: 0.978723 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
~power*trdp*trnsfs*~govsupp        0.205418     0.088036     1.000000  
power*trdp*trnsfs*gvsupp          0.318284     0.200903     0.965753  
solution coverage: 0.406321          
solution consistency: 0.972973 
Step 2: domestic constraint conditions         
in combination with result for preference conditions (POWER + ~govsupp); two analyses, in combination 
with POWER, one in combination with ~govsupp)
in combination with ~govsupp:         
consistency cutoff: 0.784038 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---         
~lawobs*~eucoord     0.810089    0.810089     0.812500  
solution coverage: 0.810089          
solution consistency: 0.812500 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---         
~(~govsupp)*~eucoord*~lawobs    0.706231     0.210683     0.795987  
~eucoord*~lawobs*constr    0.599407     0.103858    0.814516 
solution coverage: 0.810089          
solution consistency: 0.817365 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
~eucoord      0.842730     0.842730     0.733850  
solution coverage: 0.842730          
solution consistency: 0.733850 
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In combination with POWER:         
consistency cutoff: 0.773399 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---          
~eucoord*~lawobs     0.810089     0.810089     0.812500  
solution coverage: 0.810089          
solution consistency: 0.812500 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
~constr*~lawobs*~eucoord    0.528190     0.163205     0.972678  
~power*~lawobs*~eucoord    0.599407     0.234421     0.762264  
solution coverage: 0.762611          
solution consistency: 0.803125 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
~eucoord      0.842730     0.842730     0.733850  
solution coverage: 0.842730          
solution consistency: 0.733850 
2.3. Analysis: compliance EU15
Step 1: preference conditions
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
consistency cutoff: 0.988281          
~power*~trnsfs         0.544980     0.544980     0.992874  
solution coverage: 0.544980          
solution consistency: 0.992874 
 --- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
~power*~trnsfs*govsupp        0.544980     0.544980     0.992874  
solution coverage: 0.544980          
solution consistency: 0.992874 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---          
govsupp*~trnsfs~power       0.544980     0.544980     0.992874  s o l u -
tion coverage: 0.544980          s o l u -
tion consistency: 0.992874 
Step 2: domestic constraint conditions         
in combination with result for preference conditions (~power *~ trnsf)
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INTERMEDIATE & PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION        
consistency cutoff: 0.734870          
capacity          0.973924     0.973924     0.797225  
solution coverage: 0.973924          
solution consistency: 0.797225
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
~(~power*~trnsf)*capacity        0.538462     0.046936     0.696459  
capacity*lawobs         0.878748     0.387223     0.839352  
solution coverage: 0.925685          
solution consistency: 0.796857 
2.4. Analysis: non-compliance EU15
Step 1: preference conditions   
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
consistency cutoff: 0.703601          
power           0.641200     0.242838     0.707831  
trnsfs           0.753070     0.354707     0.773109  
solution coverage: 0.995907          
solution consistency: 0.676552 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
power*~trdp*govsupp         0.533424     0.365621     0.741935  
~power*trnsfs*govsupp       0.492497     0.324693     0.738241  s o l u -
tion coverage: 0.858117          s o l u -
tion consistency: 0.709932 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---          
trnsfs                   0.753070     0.398363    0.773109  
~trdp*power         0.582537     0.227831     0.750439  
solution coverage: 0.980900          
solution consistency: 0.707677 
Step 2: domestic constraint conditions         
in combination with result for preference conditions (POWER + TRNSF)
in combination with POWER
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---          
consistency cutoff: 0.994286          
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~constr*~capacity         0.663029     0.663029     0.997947  
solution coverage: 0.663029          
solution consistency: 0.997947 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
~capacity*~constr*~lawobs        0.549795     0.246930     0.997525  
~power*~capacity*~constr         0.336971     0.034106     0.995968  
solution coverage: 0.583902          
solution consistency: 0.997669 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
~capacity          0.740791     0.740791     0.964476  
solution coverage: 0.740791          
solution consistency: 0.964476 
in combination with TRNSF
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---          
consistency cutoff: 0.994709          
Assumptions: ~trnsf (absent)          
~constr*~capacity         0.663029     0.663029     0.997947  
solution coverage: 0.663029          
solution consistency: 0.997947
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---          
~capacity*~constr*~lawobs        0.549795     0.075034     0.997525  
trnsfs*~capacity*~constr        0.540246     0.065484     0.997481  
solution coverage: 0.615280          
solution consistency: 0.997788 
 --- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---          
~capacity          0.740791     0.740791     0.964476  
solution coverage: 0.740791          
solution consistency: 0.964476 
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